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Chapter 9
Gastarbeiter Migration Revisited: 
Consolidating Germany’s Position 
as an Immigration Country
Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels and Jutta Höhne
9.1  Introduction
An emerging trend has solidified after the 2008 economic crisis: Germany is, thanks 
to substantial Southern European migration, once again a key migrant-receiving 
country – and, more importantly, now sees itself as such. Positive net migration 
from Southern Europe was reached in 2010 for the first time since 1996, after 
increases since 2006. This post-crisis flow of EU migrants from Southern Europe to 
Germany bears a strong resemblance to the post-war Gastarbeiter (guest worker) 
migration. Then, however, an economic crisis ended the bi-lateral agreements; 
today, a crisis has re-initiated this migration, albeit a more highly-skilled flow than 
in post-war years. This chapter will argue that the post-crisis migration – and, above 
all, the targeted recruitment which is a key component of that migration – has con-
firmed Germany’s position as an immigration country, not only in Europe, but 
internationally.
This chapter will draw on both quantitative and qualitative data to do so. It will, 
first, review the socio-economic situation in Germany, and, second, look at data 
trends of migration to Germany since 2000, when Germany first declared itself an 
immigration country. Third, the chapter will compare contemporary Southern 
European migration flows to that of post-war Gastarbeiter migration. This section 
will also argue that contemporary migration must be seen against the backdrop of 
other migration flows to Germany – not only Gastarbeiter, but also post-war flows 
of German expellees from Eastern Europe, asylum seekers, flows from the German 
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Democratic Republic and, finally, Aussiedler, or ethnic German migrants from 
Eastern Europe.
Finally, the chapter will turn to contemporary debates over migration. In addition 
to other ongoing migration and refugee flows, these include continuing discussions 
about migrant integration – with Turkish migrants and their children usually the 
focus of that discussion. Above all, however, this chapter argues that the discourse 
in Germany today is that of a consolidated immigration country – one where immi-
gration as a phenomenon is widely accepted, and public discussions over type, pro-
file and number of migrants are part of public debate as they are in the United States, 
Canada or Australia.
9.2  Socio-economic Situation in Germany (2000–2014)
By mid-2008, Germany was among the economies hit hardest by recession. Because 
of the country’s strong export dependency, GDP fell sharply by 5.6 % in 2009, an 
even stronger fall than the average European decline of 4.4 %. As a reaction to the 
crisis, the German Federal Government introduced a set of direct and indirect mea-
sures meant to secure and create employment and other business support instru-
ments (stimulus packages 1 and 2) in November 2008 and January 2009, followed 
by a third programme in December 2009 (Growth Acceleration Act) (Stein and 
Aricò 2010: 571). Recovery set in by late 2009, and in 2010, GDP grew by 4.1 % 
and was back to pre-recession levels by early 2011 (Fig. 9.1).
Although Germany was more severely affected by the global economic down-
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Fig. 9.1 GDP growth rates, EU 28 and Germany, 2000–2014 (Source: http://stats.oecd.org)
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between 2008 and 2009. Furthermore, in contrast to the increasing average 
 unemployment within the EU 28, unemployment in Germany has been constantly 
declining since 2009 (Fig. 9.2).
This successful stabilisation of employment in Germany is related to several fac-
tors. Stein and Aricò (2010) note that the crisis primarily affected the manufacturing 
sector, but the loss of full-time jobs in that sector was compensated by the creation 
of part-time jobs in the service sector. A set of measures promoting internal flexibil-
ity within firms, e.g. the use of working-time accounts and reduction in over time, 
were a key reason for the stable levels of employment. Most importantly, regula-
tions for short-time work were extended, i.e. companies had more financial incen-
tives to keep their employees during the crisis (workers accepted a reduction in 
hours and payment, and the state covered up to 70 % of the salary), in order to 
maintain a skilled labour force after the recession (Stein and Aricò 2010: 571; 
Hallerberg 2013: 265).
Despite its comparatively good performance, the German labour market has nev-
ertheless taken a problematic turn: job growth is strongly related to an increase in 
non-standard and precarious employment, a trend which started in the early 1990s. 
Between 1991 and 2012, the number of part-time workers rose from 2.5 to over 5 
million, and the number of employees on fixed-term contracts rose from 2 to 2.7 
million workers. Moreover, there were notable increases in the number of temp 
agency workers and “solo self-employed” (self-employed people who do not have 
employees). The group of so-called “Minijobbers”, i.e. employees working part- 
time and earning less than 450 Euros per month, grew from 0.65 to 2.55 million 
(Schulten and Schulze Buschoff 2015: 1–2).
The increase in atypical employment is in part a consequence of changes in the 
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Fig. 9.2 Unemployment rates, EU 28 and Germany, by age groups (15–24 and 15–64), 2000–
2014 (Data for 2000 and 2001: EU 27. Source: Eurostat Database)
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2005, the comparatively generous unemployment compensation, previously 
 calculated as a function of the last wage, was replaced by a needs-tested low-level 
“flat rate” benefit (Hartz IV) for those still unemployed after 1 year, followed by 
further cuts if an individual rejected a job offer. These reforms, explicitly seeking to 
strengthen market forces – assumed to be the best way to create more growth and 
jobs – resulted in a far-reaching deregulation of the labour market. They did gener-
ate more jobs, but led to an increase in precarious employment and growing social 
insecurity (Bispinck and Schulten 2011: 1).
Nonetheless, the German economic position was comparatively strong, and, 
together with the lack of jobs in Southern Europe, triggered a sharp increase in 
intra-EU migration from 2009. Given the precarious situation in their home coun-
tries, EU migrants often accept precarious forms of employment and jobs for which 
they are overqualified. Migrants are overrepresented among the atypically employed 
(see below).
In recent years, labour force inflow to Germany has also been officially encour-
aged, primarily as a means to address a skills gap (Fachkräftemangel). Even before 
the crisis, this shortage of qualified workers and academic specialists had been iden-
tified as a potential problem in the near future (Dietz and Walwei 2007). To combat 
the shortage of skilled workers, the German government decided in 2008 to facili-
tate labour market access for highly qualified migrants, followed by further compre-
hensive legal provisions in 2012 and 2013 to attract high-skilled work force from 
abroad. The December 2014 analysis on labour shortage by the Federal Employment 
Agency (BA) (BA 2014a) stated that, although there was not a widespread lack of 
skilled workers, there were shortages in a number of professions. The Whitelist 
regulating third-country migration into recognised occupations of August 2014 (BA 
2014b) includes a limited number of technical specialisations, as well as profes-
sions in elderly care, health and nursing. Although detailed future projections are 
difficult, a recent governmental report highlights the key role of migration and 
migrant integration for securing employment and growth in Germany (BMAS 
2015).
9.3  Migration Flows: Trends in Immigration to Germany, 
2000–2013
Since 2000, in contrast to earlier periods, immigration to Germany has been charac-
terised by a strong increase in intra-EU immigration. Between 2000 and 2003, the 
majority of new arrivals still came from non-EU countries. From 2004 on, the 
annual inflow from EU 26 countries, Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Switzerland 
(in the following referred to as EU 26+4) always exceeded the number of new arriv-
als from non-EU member states. The migration statistics data in Table 9.1 show that 
EU 26+4 flows to Germany more than doubled, largely due to increased migration 
from Eastern and Southern EU countries to Germany since 2010. Immigration from 
EU-8 countries increased starting with the 2004 EU enlargement. The absolute 
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annual numbers from Southern European countries, which had been decreasing 
until 2006, slowly recovered from 2007 on, and sharply increased between 2010 
and 2013.
In 2013, citizens from EU 26+4 represented 64 % of all new arrivals in Germany. 
Of the 709,686 EU 26+4 migrants in 2013, 69.3 % came from Central and Eastern 
European countries and 19.9 % from the Southern European countries. In the same 
year, 648,911 non-citizens left the country, among them 419,240 people moving to 
EU 26+4 countries. Balancing arrivals against departures, net migration to Germany 
was 459,160 in 2013. The highest positive balances were registered for citizens 
from Eastern EU.
Between 2000 and 2013, the non-citizen population in Germany grew only mod-
erately. While the numbers of Turkish citizens and citizens of the former Yugoslavia 
declined, data show a clear increase for migrants from Eastern EU countries. 
Numbers of Southern Europeans increased slightly only from 2011 (Table 9.2).
Table 9.1 Immigration to Germany, 2000–2013: influx per year and net migration balance (in 
1000s)
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
Annual inflow
Southern EU 70.5 56.6 43.1 39.0 43.4 57.1 82.8 117.9 141.1
Eastern EU 154.6 165.7 207.4 228.9 237.3 288.4 396.0 454.2 491.5
Northern/Western 
Europe
67.8 62.6 58.5 60.1 64.1 64.7 69.3 72.5 76.0
EU 26+4 293.1 285.1 309.1 328.2 345.0 410.6 548.8 645.4 709.7
Total immigration 649.2 658.3 602.2 558.5 573.8 683.5 841.7 965.9 1108.1
% EU 26+4 on 
total immigration
45.1 43.3 51.3 58.8 60.1 60.1 65.2 66.8 64.0
Net migration balance
Southern EU −3.3 −16.0 −28.2 −13.5 −14.4 8.3 37.4 68.3 81.7
Eastern EU 33.0 30.5 40.8 61.4 19.9 78.6 158.5 184.7 185.7
Northern/Western 
Europe
11.0 6.3 0.4 13.0 3.3 9.9 18.4 21.4 22.2
EU 26+4 40.8 20.9 13.0 61.0 8.8 97.0 214.7 274.9 290.4
Total immigration 86.5 152.8 55.2 74.7 10.7 153.9 302.9 387.1 459.2
Data: Migration Statistics (Destatis 2014)
Southern EU: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain; Eastern EU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia; Northern/Western Europe: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finnland, France, Ireland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom; EU 26+4: EU 27 countries, Norway, 
Liechtenstein, Iceland, Switzerland
Migration statistics indicate the number of actual changes of place of residence. Since both arrivals 
to and departures from Germany are registered, it is possible to calculate annual net migration 
 balances
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Table 9.2 Foreign citizens resident in Germany, 2000–2013 (in 1000 persons)
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
Southern EU 1247.7 1228.0 1089.2 1060.3 1030.3 1012.8 1029.6 1068.5 1132.2
Eastern EU 580.3 614.3 559.9 644.9 722.1 818.6 949.0 1126.6 1343.1
Northern/Western Europe 672.3 681.3 613.5 634.2 652.7 655.2 664.5 675.0 695.5
Turkey 1998.5 1912.2 1764.3 1738.8 1688.4 1629.5 1607.2 1575.7 1549.8
Former Yugoslavia 1087.5 1044.5 827.8 646.8 773.4 734.4 724.8 727.5 747.7
Total non-citizens 7296.8 7335.6 6717.1 6751.0 6727.6 6753.6 6930.9 7213.7 7633.6
EU 26+4 2501.6 2525.0 2263.7 2340.5 2406.4 2488.0 2644.5 2871.7 3172.8
Data: Central Register of Foreigners (Destatis 2015)
The data indicates the number of non-citizens registered in Germany on December 31 of the reference year. As the Central Register of Foreigners counts each 
























At the end of 2013, 7.6 million non-citizens lived in Germany. Of these, 1.54 
million were Turkish citizens, 609,855 held Polish passports, 552,943 were Italians, 
and the fourth largest group at 316,331 was Greek.
According to 2013 data, first generation immigrants have been living in Germany 
on average for 22.5 years. The highest averages were recorded for immigrants born 
in Italy (31.2 years), Turkey (28.7 years) and Greece (28.3 years) (BAMF 2015a: 
236). Data show, however, that intra-EU migration in particular no longer necessar-
ily involves the idea of long-term or permanent change of the country of residence. 
Instead, EU freedom of movement and unrestricted return options seem to have 
turned migration into a temporary project. 48.9 % of all non-citizens who left 
Germany in 2013 had stayed for less than 12 months. The share of short-term stays 
was highest among Romanians (59.4 %) and Spaniards (58.4 %). Among the Italians, 
Greeks and Portuguese who left Germany in 2013, between 41.9 % and 44.2 % had 
spent less than 12 months there (BAMF 2015a: 112).
9.3.1  Demographic Overview: 2012
In 2012, 15.3 million people, i.e. 19.1 % of the entire population in Germany, had 
apersonal parental history of migration.1 Of those, 10 million were first- generation 
migrants born abroad, another 5.2 million had at least one parent born abroad, i.e. 
belonged to the second generation. 42.4 % of the migrants and their children were 
foreign nationals. Of the working-age population, 20.6 % were first generation 
migrants or their children. About 1.1 million working-age migrants, i.e. 2 % of the 
15–64 years old men and women, arrived between 2007 and 2012.
Migrants living in Germany differ from the native population in terms of age, 
qualifications, and labour market integration. Overall, migrants are on average 
younger than the German population. For first generation migrants this is not the 
case, however, for Aussiedler and for immigrants born in Northern and Western 
Europe or the former guest worker countries. In terms of labour market perspec-
tives, the age structure among recent migrants has become more favourable: in 
2012, migrants’ average ages varied from 28.6 (new Turkish migrants) to 34.8 (new 
migrants from Western and Northern Europe), indicating that in recent years 
Germany has succeeded in attracting young people.
Levels of formal education are overall higher among native Germans than among 
migrants. The share of unskilled labourers among Turkish and Southern EU citizens 
is well above average, due to the fact that many of them are former guest workers 
who were recruited for low-skilled jobs in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, 
compared to natives, the share of academics is twice as large among migrants from 
Western and Northern Europe. Migrants from non-EU countries other than specified 
in Tables 9.3 and 9.4 have both more unskilled and more highly skilled. Broken 
1 For more details on this concept, see Sect. 9.5.
9 Gastarbeiter Migration Revisited in Germany
156
Table 9.3 Population resident in Germany by selected origin groups and age, 2012
Total population Working age population













Natives 65,619,883 45.9 47 42,930,944 41.4 43
Turkey 1,446,162 46.3 45 1,240,176 42.8 43 53,424 28.6 27
Aussiedler 3,120,967 46.2 46 2,480,284 41.3 42 30,270 31.9 29
Eastern EU 1,155,468 39.9 38 1,016,847 39.2 38 320,581 33.4 31
Southern EU 825,452 49.9 51 650,417 45.5 47 72,975 32.1 30
  Greece 393,778 38.9 39 172,989 45.7 48 20,249 33.1 31
  Italy 749,660 37.1 38 320,327 46.8 49 22,682 32.7 31
  Portugal 163,218 35.4 36 88,821 42.0 44 9548 30.6 27
  Spain 162,433 37.6 38 68,280 43.6 44 20,496 31.2 30
North/West. Europe 692,761 47.9 49 534,772 44.3 46 145,159 34.8 32
Former Yugoslavia 720,278 48.0 47 596,582 44.6 44 32,042 33.2 31
Other non EU 2,719,459 40.1 39 2,412,407 38.7 38 422,466 30.6 29
2nd generation 5,352,458 14.9 12 2,229,951 25.3 22
Source: Microcensus 2012, weighted; own calculations
Data in Tables 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, and 9.6 differentiate first generation immigrants by selected countries of birth. The “2nd generation” category covers all children 
of immigrants born in Germany, irrespective of the country their parent(s) were born.
Southern EU: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain; Eastern EU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia; 

























down by field of training, migrants are overall slightly overrepresented in engineer-
ing and technical disciplines.
In recent years, Germany has attracted a younger and more highly skilled work-
force. Of the migrants who have come to Germany since 2007, 29.6 % are highly 
skilled. 32.6 % of the recent Southern EU migrants have a university degree. In the 
latter group, Spaniards have the highest qualifications, regardless of period of 
migration. These data confirm the results of an analysis of the qualification profiles 
of EU nationals living in Germany that was carried out by the Expert Council on 
Integration and Migration. It shows that Germany has profited considerably from 
the freedom of movement in the EU as a result of the better qualified and younger 
migrants – on average 10 years younger (SVR 2013: 17–18).
9.3.2  Labour Market Integration
Table 9.5 shows that migrants are, relatively, in a weaker position in the German 
labour market. While Northern and Western Europeans are well-integrated, all other 
groups, including Southern European migrants, have higher rates of unemployment 
and of atypical jobs. Despite higher-than-average levels of formal education, recent 
migrants, especially from non-EU countries, have even greater difficulties in finding 
Table 9.4 Working-age population resident in Germany by origin, period of immigration and 
level of education, 2012 (percentages)
Total working age population
Recent migrants (year of 














Natives 13.53 71.05 15.42
Turkey 67.94 28.25 3.81 61.23 24.93 13.84
Aussiedler 23.62 64.95 11.42 27.81 49.84 22.35
Eastern EU 20.28 60.71 19.01 29.33 51.72 18.95
Southern EU 52.89 37.02 10.09 30.83 36.53 32.63
  Greece 54.23 35.64 10.13 35.23 38.18 26.59
  Italy 55.91 36.06 8.03 31.52 33.67 34.80
  Portugal 58.06 37.90 4.03 45.54 43.85 10.61
  Spain 28.69 43.82 27.50 19.23 34.83 45.95
North/West. Europe 15.05 50.32 34.64 12.15 44.40 43.45
Former Yugoslavia 41.25 52.75 6.00 31.65 52.11 16.24
Other non EU 35.27 41.60 23.12 26.36 37.66 35.98
2nd generation 44.87 49.56 5.57
Total 18.30 66.66 15.05 27.45 42.92 29.63
Source: Microcensus 2012, weighted; own calculations
Low-skilled: primary and lower secondary education (ISCED 0–2), medium-skilled: upper and 
post-secondary education (ISCED 3–4), high-skilled: tertiary education (ISCED 5–6)
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(<32 h/week) Self- employment
Share of managers 
and professionalsa
Natives 78.5 4.7 39.0 13.0 24.9 5.8 46.7
Turkey 64.2 11.4 42.8 11.7 30.1 4.5 13.7
Aussiedler 80.8 6.3 42.4 14.4 27.4 3.5 29.8
Eastern EU 78.8 7.9 54.9 19.3 31.3 13.4 32.1
Southern EU 77.8 7.7 38.6 11.6 25.7 5.3 25.2
  Greece 74.6 9.5 42.1 13.1 28.1 n.a. 25.6
  Italy 78.6 7.6 36.5 11.0 24.5 n.a. 24.2
  Portugal 82.1 4.9 39.4 11.8 24.6 n.a. 14.7
  Spain 76.4 7.7 38.7 1.3 27.5 n.a. 44.3
North/West. Europe 77.7 3.8 42.4 12.1 25.3 13.9 61.0
Former Yugoslavia 70.5 8.4 42.6 12.7 30.1 4.6 21.6
Other non EU 67.6 12.2 53.6 20.9 34.8 8.2 33.5
2nd generation 56.4 1.6 54.3 33.5 24.0 3.7 27.8
























Recent migrants (year of migration 2007 or later)
Natives
Turkey 46.6 18.8 69.0 31.8 43.3 4.3 18.0
Aussiedler 59.5 18.5 59.4 38.0 28.8 1.5 29.2
Eastern EU 76.8 9.5 61.2 31.6 23.3 18.6 21.6
Southern EU 70.6 11.8 50.2 27.0 24.9 7.4 45.4
  Greece 69.0 18.5 67.3 32.8 33.3 n.a. 32.9
  Italy 75.7 3.4 49.4 32.8 19.4 n.a. 46.4
  Portugal 67.7 12.2 40.0 16.4 20.0 n.a. 28-6
  Spain 67.7 15.4 39.8 19.7 26.8 n.a. 64.3
North/West. Europe 75.0 4.2 45.9 24.7 19.8 14.2 70.0
Former Yugoslavia 57.2 6.2 70.1 44.3 33.7 3.4 18.5
Other non EU 46.6 13.6 67.7 40.7 40.1 6.6 48.0
Source: Microcensus 2012, weighted; own calculations






















jobs and more often have precarious forms of employment. Recently arrived Italians, 
however, have lower rates of unemployment than their long-resident compatriots, 
thus lowering the overall difference between average unemployment and recent 
migrants’ unemployment.
Occupational attainment,2 however, is much stronger among recent migrants – 
most notably among the Southern Europeans – which hints at a possible trend 
towards polarisation in the sense that the highly-skilled are more successful than 
average, while less qualified newcomers experience more problems than the group 
average. Labour market outcomes of Western and Northern Europeans are, how-
ever, less influenced by length of stay, allowing for the conclusion – strongly 
 supported by the high shares of managers and professionals among them – that it is 
rather the pull factors that attract migrants who have good labour market perspec-
tives from these countries. On the other hand, a high incidence of non-standard 
employment, in particular the high rate of temporary jobs, among the other recent 
migrants highlights the importance of push factors for migration to Germany.
Not reflected in the descriptive data, but uncovered by multivariate analyses, is 
the fact that migrants often work in jobs for which they are overqualified, in 
Germany as well as in many other destination countries (Friedberg 2000; Kogan 
2003; van Tubergen 2006; Chiswick and Miller 2008). In Germany, disadvantages 
in occupational attainment are most pronounced for non-EU migrants, but are also 
substantial for EU-10 and Southern European migrants (Kogan 2011; Fleischmann 
and Höhne 2013; Höhne and Schulze Buschoff 2015).
Poor prospects in the labour market and precarious forms of employment among 
migrants are strongly related to risk of poverty and welfare dependency. Data in 
Table 9.6 show that, due to the relative rates of labour market integration, non-EU 
migrants have the highest rate of living on minimum social security benefits.
Labour market indicators show that many migrant groups are still unemployed at 
higher rates and have more precarious employment conditions than German citi-
zens. Lower education levels play a key role, although part of the gap can also be 
explained by language deficiencies and job-qualification mismatches.
9.4  Southern European Migration to Post-War Germany: 
Gastarbeiter Migration in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s
Today’s Southern European migrants are more highly skilled than the post-war 
Gastarbeiter or guest workers – so called because they were intended to stay only 
for several years. This section will discuss key issues relating to this post-war migra-
tion flow, with the next section moving on to similar discussions today.
2 Occupational attainment is measured by the share of persons working as managers, professionals 
or technicians and associate professionals, classified according to the major ISCO groups.
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Germany became virtually synonymous with Gastarbeiter migration (Castles 
1986; Herbert 2003), although, in European comparison, it was a relative late-comer 
to guest worker recruitment, with Switzerland, Austria and Belgium (see Chap. 7 of 
this volume) having established such schemes some years earlier. Initially, labour 
was not needed in Germany, given eight million Germans expelled from former 
German territories in Eastern Europe (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2002: 116). By 
the mid-1950s, however, the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) that character-
ised post-war Germany was well under way, and more workers were needed.
The first of a series of bi-lateral labour recruitment agreements was signed 
between Italy and Germany in 1955, while the agreement with Turkey, which became 
Table 9.6 Predominant source of income of 15 to 64-year olds, by origin, 2012 (row percentages)











Basic social security 
and basic 
unemployment benefits 
(SGB XII, “Hartz IV”)
Natives 68.40 9.82 16.76 5.02
Turkey 49.59 10.22 24.95 15.24
Aussiedler 68.20 8.44 15.99 7.38
Eastern EU 65.77 6.95 19.13 8.16
Southern EU 65.75 9.43 17.23 7.59
  Greece 61.88 11.81 17.92 8.39
  Italy 66.06 9.49 15.73 8.71
  Portugal 72.20 6.47 16.46 4.86
  Spain 65.69 6.99 23.47 3.85
North/West. 
Europe
68.95 8.24 19.54 3.27
Former 
Yugoslavia
57.73 14.77 17.84 9.66
Other non EU 51.17 7.80 24.50 16.54
2nd generation 42.34 4.69 45.50 7.48
Total 65.92 9.44 18.53 6.10
Recent migrants (year of immigration 2007 or later)
Turkey 33.33 6.68 46.74 13.25
Aussiedler 44.22 6.24 24.33 25.21
Eastern EU 65.52 3.99 23.74 6.76
Southern EU 59.18 5.90 30.00 4.92
North/West. 
Europe
67.44 8.21 22.83 1.53
Former 
Yugoslavia
46.42 15.99 31.20 6.39
Other non EU 33.18 12.62 40.04 14.16
Source: Microcensus 2012, weighted; own calculations
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the most significant, was signed in 1961 (Bpb 2010). In September 1964, Germany 
celebrated with fanfare the arrival of the one millionth Gastarbeiter (Schulze 2014). 
Less than ten years later, recruitment was stopped in 1973, following the interna-
tional oil crisis and worldwide recession. Although migrants and governments alike 
had expected the guest workers to return “home” in 1973, instead, their families 
joined them. A number of migrants did return to their home countries, but the overall 
number of non-German citizens in Germany rose from 3.9 million in 1973 to 4.6 
million in 1980, or 7.4 % of the population (Rühl 2009: 49; OECD 1997: 218). In 
1985, Turkish citizens were the largest non-German citizen group, at 1.4 million, 
followed by those from (the former) Yugoslavia at 590,000, Italy and Greece (OECD 
1997: 227). Spain and Portugal were the seventh and eighth largest nationalities 
(OECD 1997: 227). The non-citizen population continued to grow, in part due to 
continued migration, but also due to a lack of jus soli and low naturalisation among 
non-Germans: children born to non-German citizens did not automatically become 
German citizens until 2000 (retroactive to 1990). Germany was heavily criticized 
until 2000 for its comparatively restrictive – in European comparison – citizenship 
policy and for its explicit statements that it was not a “country of immigration”.
Despite the end of guest worker recruitment in 1973, migration to Germany con-
tinued. Family reunification continued to represent a significant number of incom-
ing migrants. 1992 was a high point of net inflow –782,000 (BAMF 2015a: 12) – but 
exceeded by the 1.1 million net migration in 2015 (Destatis 2016). In addition to 
family reunification, the net inflow in 1992 also included flows directly linked to the 
end of the Cold War, with a large number of asylum-seekers (438,000), and migrants 
who were German citizens – 230,000 Aussiedler, or ethnic German migrants from 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Aussiedler migration was restricted sharply 
starting in 1990 (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2009), and declined to 2400 by 2013 
(BVA 2013). This post-Cold War migration flow was a very particular part of the 
history of migration to Germany.
The primary story of the guest worker migration is the shift from recruitment to 
family reunification in the 1970s and 1980s, when Germany was a “reluctant land 
of immigration” (Martin 2014: 224), and to a self-acknowledged country of immi-
gration in 2000. Germany’s historical reluctance to embrace migration is the back-
drop to the more enthusiastic recruitment of Southern European migrant workers 
today.
9.5  Debates in the Twenty-First Century
9.5.1  Integration
The current recruitment of Southern Europeans cannot thus be seen in isolation, but 
must be examined against the backdrop of the ongoing discussions of about the 
integration of post-war migrants and their children. When Gastarbeiter recruitment 
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ended in 1973, the era of family reunification, and with it the integration of 
Ausländer, or foreigners, started, albeit in fits and starts – illustrated by an examina-
tion of the evolution of the terminology used to refer to non-German citizens living 
in Germany. A succession of terms has been used and discarded, reflecting the 
evolving discussion on integration and demonstrating the shift from “reluctant land 
of immigration” to confirmed immigration country. Over time, the term Gastarbeiter 
became seen as inaccurate and even offensive, given the clear settlement of migrants 
in Germany. It was far less common by the early 1980s and was last used in 
Bundestag documents in 1994.
Government documents and speeches shifted as early as 1976 to the use of the 
term Ausländer – many of whom were born in Germany. This term gradually 
became the predominant term, and remained so until the late 1990s. Ausländische 
Mitbürger, or “foreign fellow citizens” (Boehm 1999), first used by German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1987 (Bundesregierung 1987), expressed these indi-
viduals’ formal non-citizen status, yet captured their social inclusion.
Although ausländische Mitbürger is still used, above all by municipalities, 
together with Zuwanderer, or migrants, the current predominant term is the unwieldy 
phrase Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund (“people with a migratory back-
ground”; perhaps best translated as “individuals of migrant origin”). It was first 
used in the 2005 Microcensus, when this group was first defined to include both citi-
zens and non-citizens, referring to any person born outside of Germany after 1949, 
or born in Germany to at least one parent who was him- or herself born abroad. It 
thus – significantly – includes both individuals of non-German origin as well as 
Aussiedler – ethnic German migrants – and their children (Destatis 2013: 6). This 
term includes all of those who have migrated to Germany, whether German or non- 
German, representing a significant step forward in the inclusion of migrants and 
their offspring.
Despite Germany’s clear shift to seeing itself as an immigration country, there 
are, as in all immigration countries, still challenges. In 2014 and 2015, there were in 
Germany, as across Europe, protests against so-called Islamisation, led in Germany 
by Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, or 
Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) (Spiegel Online 2014b; 
Braden et al. 2015). At nearly every protest, counter-protestors outnumbered the 
Pegida supporters. Nonetheless, Dresden’s high-tech industry was concerned that 
Pegida protests might deter their much-needed foreign highly skilled workers 
(El-Sharif and Schultz 2015). Chancellor Merkel clearly condemned the demonstra-
tions in her 2015 New Year address, noting that migration “benefits us all” 
(Bundesregierung 2014). Germany’s status as an immigration country was, once 
again, clearly acknowledged and supported by the Chancellor. Germany is also the 
largest receiving country in Europe for Syrian refugees, with clear leadership from 
Chancellor Merkel, despite some opposition. In addition to over 200,000 asylum- 
seekers who filed a claim in Germany in 2014 (BAMF 2015b) and nearly 500,000 in 
2015 (BAMF 2015d), Germany led the EU response to Syrians in 2015, accepting 
31,000 of the 120,000 to be re-located within Europe (BMI 2015) and accepting 
30,000 Syrian refugees from first countries of asylum; nearly two-thirds of the 
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 overall European pledge (UNHCR 2015). In short, Germany, like the classic immi-
gration countries United States, Canada and Australia, has clear family, labour and 
humanitarian streams of migration.
9.5.2  Country of Immigration
German politicians famously stated for many years that Germany was “not a coun-
try of immigration.” A turning point was the Independent Migration Commission’s 
2001 report which noted that “Germany is, in point of fact, a country of immigra-
tion” (Unabhängige Kommission “Zuwanderung” 2001: 1).
This statement reified what had been strongly indicated in 2000 by the passage 
of a heavily revised Citizenship Act introducing jus soli. Following this Act, chil-
dren born in Germany to non-citizen parents, at least one of whom had lived for at 
least 8 years in Germany, received German citizenship at birth. Although naturalisa-
tion had long been possible in Germany, and was facilitated in 1990, 1993 and 2000, 
it often required relinquishing the original citizenship (after 2000 only in about 
50 % of the cases), which was shown to be one factor inhibiting naturalisation for 
non-EU citizens (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006). Taking effect 1 January 2005, a 
new Immigration Law was another important step in Germany’s transition to an 
immigration country. The Immigration Law effectively introduced highly skilled 
migration, which became regulated by law, rather than government ordinances such 
as the Green Card.
There remain significant concerns within Germany about the poorer-than- 
wished-for integration of Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund, as discussed in 
Sect. 9.3 above. Their chances of achieving higher education, work commensurate 
with their education, and employment overall remain lower than those of their 
native German peers (see Tables 9.5 and 9.6), although numerous policies and pro-
grammes are undertaken to address these shortcomings. In 2006, Chancellor Angela 
Merkel developed a National Integration Plan and introduced the annual 
Integrationsgipfel, or Integration Summit. Dismissed by some as “nothing more 
than Kaffeeklatsch” (Conrad 2005), others promoted the event while Chancellor 
Merkel noted that previously disregarded but important issues had been raised 
(Conrad 2005).
Recent German government policy vis-à-vis those of migrant origin – recent 
migrants, long-term residents and their children – is markedly and explicitly more 
inclusive than at any point in post-war German history. Chancellor Merkel’s 2013 
statement “It is not enough to be a country with a high migration rate; we also have 
to become a country of integration” (Die Welt 2013a) is illustrative. Challenges – 
perhaps even the hallmark of an immigration country – remain, such as opposition 
in some quarters over welcoming nearly 500,000 asylum-seekers in 2015, but they 
are recognised and steps are taken to address them.
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9.5.3  Post-Accession Migration
Post-accession migration from Eastern and Central Europe has been significant (see 
Table 9.1), despite restrictions placed on EU-8 migration until 1 May 2011. Above 
all, the migration of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens to Germany, whose freedom 
of movement restrictions expired on 1 January 2014, raised the question of so-called 
“welfare migration” or “poverty migration” – the claim that individuals migrated to 
Germany only to claim benefits. The Institute for Employment Research found that 
only a minority of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in Germany were claiming 
child benefits (16.7 %) (Spiegel Online 2014a), yet widespread impressions of 
exploitation of the system remained.
Municipalities in Germany were permitted to place restrictions on access to 
Hartz IV social assistance, a decision contested by a Romanian woman. The case 
was heard before the European Court of Justice, which decided that EU citizens did 
not have a right to social assistance during the first 3 months of their stay in another 
EU country and that countries may deny social assistance to EU citizens who move 
for the sole purpose of acquiring that assistance (Spiegel Online 2014c; Curia 2014). 
The deregulation undertaken prior to increased net migration thus continued. The 
decision does not affect EU citizens who have never worked in Germany nor those 
who come to Germany to work.
The post-accession migration, coupled with ongoing discussions about integrat-
ing the children and grandchildren of the post-war Gastarbeiter and later refugees 
and other migrants, is another element of the context in which contemporary 
Southern European migration must be seen.
9.5.4  Highly Skilled Migration in Germany
Post-war Gastarbeiter migration was the result of bi-lateral national-level recruit-
ment of low-skilled individuals, needed in the booming post-war economy. The 
more recent shift toward the recruitment of highly skilled migrants – whether EU 
citizens or not – can be traced back to concern which emerged in the 1990s over the 
Fachkräftemangel particularly in the IT industry (Neubecker 2014). Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder’s unexpected announcement at the 2000 computer fair CeBIT that 
a programme to cover a labour shortage for IT workers, the so-called Green Card,3 
would be implemented immediately (Astheimer 2010), was the first policy reflec-
tion of this concern. The CeBIT announcement sparked debate, sometimes rancor-
ous, as to whether further immigration to Germany was needed, but the Green Card 
was implemented (Spiegel Online 2000), just as Germany was shifting to a 
3 The programme’s name can be assumed to have been intended to invoke the immigration culture 
of the United States, but it is a misnomer – the Green Card in the United States is the identification 
of the permanent resident; the H1-B visa would be the equivalent (Kolb 2005).
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self-recognition as an immigration country. The concern over lack of skilled work-
ers continues to be reflected today in recruitment from Southern Europe and 
further.
Nearly 15,000 non-EU nationals (primarily Indians, Russians and Romanians) 
took advantage of the Green Card programme by mid-2004, a number acclaimed by 
some, but which prompted others to call it a failure – not all 20,000 annual spots 
were filled (Kolb 2005, Creutzberg 2013). Above all, however, the programme re- 
introduced the argument that immigration could be a positive force in Germany 
(Astheimer 2010) and led to positive debate on the need to reform immigration in 
Germany (Kolb 2005). Although intended for Third Country Nationals, not EU citi-
zens, and later subsumed into the Immigration Law passed in 2004, the Green Card 
played a key role in indicating both the willingness of Germany to recruit skilled 
workers as well as demonstrating the needs of the economy.
9.5.4.1  New Recruitment of Southern Europeans in Germany
Young Southern European engineers, healthcare workers and others, many of whom 
do not have further training opportunities at home, are explicitly recruited to fill the 
need for trained labour in a range of professions, thus both providing labour in 
Germany and gaining skills which could be brought back home. This post-crisis 
migration could thus be characterised as having elements of migration and develop-
ment.4 Whether they are able to find commensurate employment in their home 
countries, effectively applying their new training, remains to be seen.
The positive net migration flow from Southern Europe continues, although it is 
considerably smaller than that of Eastern EU countries (141,000 compared to 
491,000; see Table 9.1). This migration flow was widely praised for bringing in 
skilled workers, but it also led to the discussion of access to social welfare with 
respect to Southern Europeans; access to basic social assistance – Hartz IV – was 
restricted first for Greeks, Portuguese and Spaniards before the restriction was 
extended to EU-10 migrants. As the Federal Labour Ministry said, “We want immi-
gration of skilled workers, not immigration into the social system” (Wisdorff 2012). 
The large-scale public debate, however, only emerged strongly with respect to 
EU-10 migrants.
If there is debate about these “model migrants” from Southern Europe (Böcking 
2014), then it is that their migration and integration is seen through the lens of the 
ongoing challenges of integrating the previous waves of migrants (Astheimer 2012). 
As then-Integration Representative Maria Böhmer said, “We must learn from the 
mistakes of the past. … People must feel accepted here. That all belongs to a wel-
coming culture” (Toprak et al. 2012). Although, overall, the government’s tone has 
been a welcoming one, shortcomings in helping migrants to learn German and settle 
4 Migration and development refers to the positive impacts that migration can have upon a sending 
country, here, migrants returning with additional skills. May also refer to remittances or transfer of 
knowledge.
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in have been acknowledged, and improved mechanisms put in place (Spiegel Online 
2014d). In contrast to the post-war flow, it is hoped – by firms and by the 
 government – that these migrants will stay (Kreuzmann and Nienhaus 2013). This 
double recognition – that these highly skilled Southern European migrants are a 
positive force for the German economy and society, and that a top-down positive, 
and long- term, context of reception is crucial for successful integration – is very 
significant in Germany’s still relatively recent position as an immigration country. 
Even so, recruitment is still not yet at the levels the government aims to achieve.
Recruitment occurs on many levels, ranging from the employers themselves to 
the Federal Employment Agency. Some rely on their own personal contacts, as one 
owner of a home health care service with 40 employees does (Siems 2014). Another 
employer, having difficulty in finding apprentices, spoke with the local chamber of 
commerce while on vacation in Mallorca, which led to ever-increasing placements 
of young Spaniards in his construction firm (Bast 2013). Nor is recruitment only 
from the German side; sending-country middlemen, themselves previously unem-
ployed, have emerged, pairing job-seekers with employment in Germany (Die Welt 
2012). Above all, however, recruitment has been coordinated by regions, munici-
palities, chambers of commerce, professional associations and by the Federal 
Employment Agency, all of which attend job fairs in Southern Europe. This recruit-
ment serves a real need in Germany, which recognises that demographic change will 
require more workers, as noted in the government-sponsored “Make it in Germany” 
webpage (Make it in Germany n.d.).
9.5.4.2  Facilitation of Employment
In recognition of both the current lack of skilled workers and the future demo-
graphic need, the German Federal government as well as several EU programmes 
have considerably facilitated the migration of young Southern Europeans and their 
recruitment by German firms.
The Federal Recognition Act (Anerkennungsgesetz), taking effect in 2012, 
sought to simplify the recognition procedure of certain foreign qualifications 
(OECD 2014: 74). While EU citizens enjoy freedom of movement within the EU, 
their qualifications often do not travel as freely, with the result that Spanish “doctors 
may exist as taxi drivers or qualified technicians slave away as laborers” (Siems 
2014). The Act sought to facilitate these recognitions (BGBl 2011). The professions 
affected fell under the federal states’ competence; by mid-2014, laws had been put 
into place in all 16 states (BMBF 2014: 24–25, Anerkennung in Deutschland). The 
Act was criticised by the Expert Council on Migration and Integration for not 
including more professions and for not having wholly addressed the complexity of 
recognition of qualifications (Flohr and Popp 2013), yet prior to the law, it took a 
doctor’s qualifications 13 months, on average, to be recognised, while the Act posits 
a maximum of three (Peters 2013). The government’s initial report on the Act noted, 
moreover, that “With the Federal Recognition Act, the Federal Government created 
for the first time a general right to have the equivalence of a foreign qualification 
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with a German referential profession assessed” (BMBF 2014: 6). The process of the 
recognition of qualifications as well as language training is financed by the German 
Federal Government (OECD 2014: 9).
The Federal Employment Agency, in conjunction with the Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs, has established the programme MobiPro EU, which 
seeks to attract young EU citizens to Germany. Of applicants in 2013, 60 % were 
Spaniards (RKW 2013, p. 4). The programme, started in 2013 and scheduled to run 
through 2018, and its website – Job of My Life5 – seeks to promote “vocational 
mobility of young EU citizens in the European labour market … to contribute to a 
reduction in youth unemployment in Europe and to obtain and secure skilled work-
ers in Germany” (BMAS 2014, no pagination). The programme covers German 
language training in the home country, an introductory internship in Germany and 
further language training – since increased – among other benefits (BMAS 2014; 
Böcking 2014). Effort is made, both on the German and migrant side, to achieve 
success in these migrations. As one migrant said, “We have two apprenticeships” – 
language training and the actual training – (Böcking 2014).
It is unclear how many of the Southern European migrants have been recruited or 
have spontaneously migrated; exact records are not kept (SVR 2013: 95). The same 
mechanism which facilitates recruitment by German regions, cities, companies and 
trade and industry chambers, namely the free movement of workers within the EU, 
also facilitates spontaneous migration.
9.5.4.3  Highly Skilled and Low Skilled Migration Alike
Although the post-2007 Southern European migrants are, on average, both more 
highly skilled than their post-war brethren and native Germans (see Table 9.4), 
those who have primary education do still make up around one-third of the total. For 
those individuals, also affected by high unemployment in their sending countries, 
Germany may not represent a more stable situation. As noted above (see Sect. 9.3), 
the labour market success of recent migrants in Germany is uneven, with skilled 
migrants achieving well, but the low-skilled considerably less so. Indeed, sociolo-
gist Tsianos calls the unstable, low-paid employment in restaurants “a precarious 
form of EU citizens’ labour mobility” (Die Welt 2013b, no pagination).
As noted above (Sect. 9.3), de-skilling plays some role for Southern Europeans 
(Siems 2014). Indeed, the highly-skilled and others may be working far below their 
skill level, pursuing additional degrees or working as au pairs, as one Spanish bio-
chemist chose to do, as a “way to learn the language and then look for a job in 
Germany as a teacher or in a research lab” (FAZ 2012, no pagination). The young 
man profiled in that 2012 story went on to work at his skill level – as a researcher in 
the chemical industry – after his current employer read the newspaper story 
(Petersdorff 2013). At the same time, there is concern, particularly in Italy, over so- 
5 https://www.thejobofmylife.de/en/home.html
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called brain drain; a higher proportion of the migrants have tertiary education than 
the general Italian population (Bremer 2013; see also Chap. 4 of this volume).
9.6  Conclusion
The new Southern European migration to Germany emerges strongly from 
Germany’s awareness of a need for migrant labour and an acceptance – and embrac-
ing – of its status as an immigration country. The backdrop to this migration is the 
ongoing integration of post-war guest workers and their descendants, increasingly 
explicitly addressed and facilitated. It can also be seen in the context of what might 
be called migration and development vis-à-vis Southern Europe. In 2012, Southern 
European countries became net remittance-receiving countries for the first time in 
10 years, indicating that Southern Europeans in Germany and elsewhere are sending 
money home. Overall, 18 billion US dollars were sent out of Germany worldwide 
in 2012 (Weingartner 2013).
It is clear that a new era of recruited Southern European migration to Germany is 
well underway, inevitably inviting comparisons with the post-war Gastarbeiter 
migration. In 2013, Germany became the most important receiving country within 
the European Union for internal European migration; one-third of all internal EU 
migrants went to Germany in 2013 (OECD 2014: 13 and 23). Thanks in part to this 
migration, in 2013, Germany became the OECD country with the second-largest 
absolute number of migrants, second only to the United States (OECD 2014: 19). 
Numerically, as well as philosophically, Germany is a consolidated immigration 
country.
Nor does the migration from Southern Europe show any signs of slowing down; 
rather, further recruitment is encouraged by the government. Whether the migration 
remains a largely circular one or shifts to permanent migration is as yet unclear, 
although it may be assumed that some portion will remain in Germany. What is also 
unclear is how the motivating factors of migration (see Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 6, this 
volume) and the substantial and increasing labour needs of Germany interact. Above 
all, from a German perspective, the new Southern European migration is seen in a 
context of demographic change and foreseeable ongoing labour shortages: 
“Immigrants are not a threat, but a chance for Germany. Demographic change will 
promote a rethinking over the next few years” (Borstel 2012).
With its recruitment of highly-skilled workers, today’s migration to Germany is 
remarkably similar to that of classic immigration countries such as the United 
States, Canada and Australia. As in all immigration countries, debates – at times 
heated and politically divisive – remain over elements of migration, such as undocu-
mented migration or arrival of asylum seekers, and will continue to do so. In 
Germany, the debate about “welfare migrants”, as opposed to highly skilled young 
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Southern Europeans, remains, as does passionate discussion over asylum seekers. 
Fundamentally, however, it can be said that Germany hopes that migration, particu-
larly from Southern Europe, will continue, and considerable effort and resources 
have been put into ensuring its continuation.
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